Surrogacy Agreements - LibGuides at Georgia State University College of Law
file:///I|/GRA%20Projects/Deborah%20-%20Fall%202012/LibGuide%20Backups/surrogacy_agreements_122829_1353174355.html[11/17/2012 1:10:59 PM]
Lack of Surrogacy Agreements in Georgia Case Law
Georgia courts have not grappled with surrogacy agreements in published opinions. Using the same searches I used for the other states, I turned up no surrogacy agreement case
law in Georgia. Like many other states without specific statutes dealing with surrogacy, courts are left to use those family provisions governing adoption, parentage, and baby-
brokering to determine whether surrogacy agreements are void, voidable, or enforceable.
Seminal Surrogacy Cases
Primary Resources: Seminal Cases in Surrogacy
Right to Privacy: Fundamental Interest in Bearing Children and the Question of State Interference
Eisenhardt v. Baird, 405 US 438 (1972)
In determining the validity of a Massachusetts statute permitting married couples to obtain contraceptives but precluding single persons from obtaining contraceptive the court held
that if the right to privacy is to “mean anything it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamental” as
the decision whether to bear a child.
Doe v. Kelley, 307 NW.2d 438 (1981)
In this case, the parties desiring to enter into a surrogacy agreement challenged a Michigan statute which prohibited the payment of fees in connection with adoption proceedings.
They argued that the prohibition of payment to the surrogate mother unconstitutionally interfered with their right to have children (established in Eisenhardt v. Baird) . The court
held that there was no unconstitutional interference because while prohibiting the payment of money in conjunction with adoption proceedings the state did not actually prevent the
parties from having the child as planned. It went on to note that though the decision to bear a child was a fundamental interest protected by the right to privacy, the parties sought
to use the adoption statutes to alter the child’s legal status (which included the child’s right to support and inheritance) and such an aim was not one of those fundamental
interests protected by the right to privacy from government intrusion.
Surrogate’s Termination of Parental Rights
Re Baby M., 537 A.2d. 1227 (1988) (on remand, 542 A.2d. 52).
Even though the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that both the intended parents and the surrogate mother entered the traditional surrogacy agreement in good faith and
thought it “right and constructive”, the court held that the surrogacy contract was invalid and void. It disagreed with the trial court’s ruling that the NJ statutes regarding adoption
and termination of parental rights did not represent the legislature’s intent with regard to surrogacy agreements and therefore did not apply to surrogacy agreements.
Instead, it held that the surrogacy agreement ran afoul of:
1) statutes prohibiting the exchange of money in connection with the placement of a child for adoption
2) statutes requiring proof of parental unfitness before terminating parental rights and approving adoption and
3) statutes that otherwise make consent to adoption placement revocable. It further held that the basic premise of the surrogacy contract, that the parents could determine the
custody of the child in advance of the birth, is in direct conflict with the settled law that such considerations are analyzed solely in terms of the best interest of the child.
Determining Maternity in Gestational Surrogacy
Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal.4th 84, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.,1993).
Where a gestational surrogate refused to surrender the child, the intended parents brought suit seeking to establish maternity using a genetic test similar to the California statute
which provides for blood tests to determine paternity. The court determined that since both gestation and a blood test may be determinative of maternity under California statutes,
it must look to the parties’ intentions. It found that the intended parents took affirmative steps to effect in vitro fertilization and but for their acted-on intention the child would not
exist. It held that under California law “she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own-is
the natural mother under California law.” Therefore, in California, gestational surrogacy arrangements now have a common law presumption that the intended, non-surrogate
mother, is the natural mother.
Arredondo by Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. 1994)
Similar to the result in Johnson v. Calvert, the court determined that the woman whose eggs were fertilized and implanted was the mother of twins born through gestational
surrogacy. The case arose not because the surrogate claimed maternity but because the birth certificates declared the surrogate to be the mother and a lower court believed it
lacked jurisdiction to determine maternity.
Elisa B. V. Super. Ct, 37 Cal. 4th 108 (Cal., 2005)
Under the Uniform Parentage Act, a child may have two parents, both of whom are women. The court determined that where a former lesbian partner had been presumed a parent
under the Uniform Parentage Act, the petitioning partner could not rebut the presumption to avoid paying child-support after the dissolution of the relationship with her former
partner. This is notable because in Johnson v. Calvert the California Supreme Court noted that the ACLU's amicus brief urged it to find the child had two mothers but declined to
hold that a child could have two mothers.
Equal Protection Considerations in Surrogacy Agreements
Soos v. Super. Ct. in & for County of Maricopa, 182 Ariz. 470. (1994).
Here the genetic mother of triplets born to a gestational surrogate challenged an Arizona law which declared all surrogates to be the legal mothers of the children they gave birth
to, regardless of whether the surrogacy was gestational or traditional. The Arizona Court of Appeals held that because the statute which allowed a biological father to prove
paternity and automatically granted surrogate mother status as legal mother but did not allow any means for biological mother, who donated eggs, to prove maternity the statute
violated the equal protection clause. Generally surrogacy agreements will not run afoul of equal protection considerations unless they provide or preclude different methods to
prove parentage to fathers and mothers.
Appropriateness of Court as Forum to Address Legality of Surrogacy Agreements
Re Baby Girl L.J., 505 NYS2d 813 (1986)
The court found that current statutes did not prohibit intended parents from paying surrogates and held that surrogate agreements were not void but instead were voidable. It
granted the adoption of a child conceived through traditional surrogacy based on the child’s best interests but stated that the legislature was the appropriate forum to address the
legality of surrogacy agreements.